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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly an-
nounced a new network of video surveillance in the City. The new network
would be able to prevent future terrorist attacks by identifying suspicious
behavior before catastrophic events could take place. Kelly told reporters,
"If we're looking for a person in a red jacket, we can call up all the red
* Acquisitions Editor, Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. (2011-2012); J.D. candidate, Benjamin
N. Cardozo School of Law, 2012; B.S., Skidmore College, 2003. Thanks to Professor Susan
Crawford for her expertise, guidance, and tremendous support, and to Molly Storey, Julie
Bernard, and the editors of this Journal.
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jackets filmed in the last 30 days,"' and "[w]e're beginning to use software
that can identify suspicious objects or behaviors."2 Gothamist later made a
witticism of Kelly's statement, remarking, "Note to terrorists: red jackets are
not a good look for you."' This small joke captured a real concern for New
Yorkers: what if you're not a terrorist, but you do happen to wear a red jack-
et in the subway on a day when the New York City Police Department is
looking for red-jacketed terrorists? And what if you happen to have brown
skin? Or pray at a mosque? Should these attributes be captured on video, are
they sufficient for the NYPD to bring you in for questioning, or even to ar-
rest you?
Surveillance cameras have been present in New York City for decades,
installed and monitored by both the NYPD and private business owners.4
After September 11th and the PATRIOT Act, their numbers surged.' The
number of cameras that capture the images of New Yorkers each day re-
mains dwarfed by those in London, where there is one camera for every
fourteen residents,' under the much-celebrated and equally controversial
"ring of steel."' However, the numbers in New York are in the thousands,
1. John Del Signore, NYPD Tightens Surveillance in Subway's "Ring of Steel," Go-
THAMIST (Sept. 21, 2010), http://gothamist.com/2010/09/21/nypd-tightens-surveillance in_
subwa.php.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See generally A History of Surveillance in New York City, NOT BORED!,
http://www.notbored.org/nyc-history.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). Not Bored! is an irregu-
larly published online journal associated with the Surveillance Camera Players that has
adopted the concept of "surveillance art," the use of technology to record human behavior, in a
way that offers commentary on the process of surveillance or the technology used to surveil.
The Surveillance Camera Players tracked video surveillance in New York City from 1996 to
2006. The Surveillance Camera Players, NOT BORED!, http://www.notbored.org/the-
scp.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012); see also Leah Borromeo, Tate Makes Surveillance an Art
Form, COMMENT Is FREE: LIBERTY CENT. (May 28, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/may/28/tate-modern-surveiIlance-art; Hugh
Hart, The Art of Surveillance, WIRED, (Nov. 30, 2007), http://www.wired.com/culture/
art/multimedia/2007/1 I/gallery-surveillance art (beginning of a series of images of artistic
surveillance devices over multiple pages).
5. See, e.g., Del Signore supra note 1; Henry Goldman, New York City Police Will
Monitor 500 More Cameras, Bloomberg Says, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20, 2010), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-20/new-york-city-will-get-500-more-subway-cameras-
under-surveillance-system.html; see also Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT
Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered titles and sections of
U.S.C.) (authorizing enhanced surveillance procedures and other domestic security measures).
6. Max Guirguis, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 143, 146 (citing Andrea Thompson, Big Brother UK, DAILY
MAIL, Jan. 23, 2004, at 24).
7. There is wide disagreement on the effectiveness of the "ring of steel." See Cara
Buckley, Manhattan Takes Cue from London's "Ring of Steel" N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 9, 2007, at
Al (reporting on the earliest implementation of the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative,
comparing it to the "ring of steel" and noting that the "ring of steel" was unable to prevent the
2005 subway bombings in London); Kieran Long, So Can the Secret Ring of Steel Save the
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particularly since the launch of the system announced by Commissioner
Kelly in 2010: the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative and the Midtown
Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI and MMSI, respectively).8 The NYPD
touts the LMSI and MMSI as unique: they form a completely networked
system, such that all video camera feeds can be monitored from a single
location, in real time.9 This type of program is anticipated to be more effec-
tive in stopping crime and terror attacks than London's static system, which
provides only playback capabilities and not real-time monitoring.o Despite
their reach, however, neither the New York nor the London program has yet
been proven effective in preventing either crime or terrorist attacks."
Any surveillance program clearly raises privacy concerns for the moni-
tored population. This Note weighs some of those concerns for New
Yorkers, not against national security interests, the validity of which this
Note largely concedes, but rather against the lack of legal accountability
built into the LMSI and MMSI. That is, this Note asks whether the possible
encroachments on privacy and the risks of abuse can be justified by a system
that was implemented with no legally binding process for accountability to
the public, thus bearing the risk of serious privacy violations and abuses.
This Note takes the position that, while a surveillance program like New
York City's may be justified and needed in the modern world, it cannot be
allowed to operate outside of any legally enforceable systems of accounta-
bility.
Part I of this Note will offer an overview of video surveillance programs
and the conflicting information regarding their efficacy in preventing and
solving crime. Part H1 examines the present state of the City and the law re-
garding video surveillance in New York City. It also contrasts the NYPD's
privacy guidelines for the LMSI and MMSI with the laws governing video
surveillance in the United Kingdom, where video surveillance was adopted
early and has been used extensively, in London and in other cities and
villages. Part III seeks to understand why Chris Dunn, Associate Legal
City from Terrorism?, LONDON EVENING STANDARD (Oct. 15, 2010), http://
www.thisislondon.co.uk/lifestyle/article-23888163-so-can-the-secret-ring-of-steel-save-the-city-
from-terrorism.do (reporting on a study of the "ring of steel" and citing the study's assertion
that the surveillance program is "is highly unlikely to prevent bomb attacks by individual
pedestrians"); Jeffrey Rosen, A Watchful State, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 7, 2001, at 38 (arguing
that, rather than preventing crime, cameras in the United Kingdom, including the "ring of
steel," are used to produce "social conformity").
8. Press Release, N.Y.C. Police Dep't, New York City Police Department Releases
Draft of Public Security Privacy Guidelines for Public Comment (Feb. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pr/pri__2009005.shtml [hereinafter NYPD Press Release].
9. Anonymous Interview (Oct. 27, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Anonymous
Interview] (This interview was conducted with a New York City official who is very close to
the LMSI/MMSI and who was not authorized by the NYPD to speak publicly about these
programs.); see also Del Signore, supra note 1.
10. Anonymous Interview, supra note 9.
11. See Buckley, supra note 7; Guirguis, supra note 6; Long, supra note 7; Rosen, su-
pra note 7.
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Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), is convinced that
there is no legal argument that could directly challenge the presence of sur-
veillance cameras in New York City.12 It will identify the types of problems
that may stem from New York City's current system, demonstrating very
real concerns about privacy invasion and other possible abuses. Part IV will
make projections as to where law and practice is heading on this issue, and
will posit recommendations and hopes for future practice.
I. THE EFFECTIVENESS QUESTION
This section presents a brief overview of the conflicting evidence re-
garding the effectiveness of video surveillance in preventing crime. The
overview is included for two reasons. The first is to draw a context for the
discussion that follows, to make clear that citizens are being asked to com-
promise their privacy interests and risk abuse for the sake of a system whose
effectiveness in making them safer is not clearly established. The second
reason is to compare most existing video surveillance programs with New
York City's relatively new Lower Manhattan and Midtown Manhattan Secu-
rity Initiatives (LMSI/MMSI) discussed in detail in Part II. These initiatives
are on the cutting edge of surveillance technology. But, as will become
clear, while their scope is substantially broader, and their capacity for effec-
tive, real-time crime prevention may prove to be greater, the privacy and
abuse concerns they raise are much the same as they always have been, and
may expand as their technological reach expands.
Cameras are championed by government and law enforcement leaders,
as well as, in some cases, the general public, as a necessity to protect against
terrorist attacks and other crime." There is evidence available to support the
assertion that crime rates have fallen in a number of cities following the in-
stallation of video surveillance programs.14 However, as the NYCLU points
12. Interview with Chris Dunn, Assoc. Legal Dir., N.Y. Civil Liberties Union (Oct. 5,
2010) [hereinafter Dunn Interview].
13. An example of a seemingly uncontroversial and effective video surveillance pro-
gram is in the city of Northampton in the United Kingdom:
[O]ne of England's earliest surveillance systems was installed at the insistence of
the public and was even partially paid for by local businesses. That was the system
of the historic city of Northampton, which was introduced in the early 1990s in the
wake of the IRA intense bombing campaigns. . . . Both short- and long-term results
were quite impressive. The cameras led to seventeen arrests the same month they
became fully operational. Two and a half years after the system's installation, po-
lice have solved 85% of all crimes in the monitored areas. By the mid-1990s,
Northampton's crime record had been cut by 57%.
Guirguis, supra note 6 at 147.
14. In the 1990s, crime declined in Tacoma, Washington, by thirty-five percent in the
first year cameras were installed; in New York City, crime rates in public housing projects
declined by between thirty and fifty percent over five years when cameras were installed; in
[Vol. 18:589
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out, the cited evidence does not clearly point to surveillance programs as the
sole or primary cause of drops in crime rates, at least in New York.'5 Many
video surveillance programs were developed and installed in the 1990s,
when crime rates were already consistently decreasing, largely due to an
expanded police force with an increased physical presence on the streets.'6
In 2006, in testimony before the New York City Council, the NYPD touted
its Video Interactive Patrol Enhancement Response (VIPER) program,"
claiming that, after security cameras were installed in City housing projects,
monitored buildings experienced a thirty-six percent drop in crime from the
previous year.18 Anecdotal evidence indicates that the cameras may have
contributed to at least some decrease in petty crime, and some residents-
and especially managers-of monitored housing projects registered
satisfaction." However, no evidence has been presented that directly con-
nects the presence of the cameras to the drop in crime in those areas.20
Similarly, in 2003, Congress directed the federal General Accounting
Office (GAO) to investigate the effectiveness of video surveillance.2' The
GAO studied four American cities22 using video surveillance and concluded
that there was simply not enough available evidence to conclusively deter-
mine whether the cameras were preventing crime.23 Such findings have been
echoed in the United Kingdom. England's Home Office released a survey in
2005, evaluating thirteen local video surveillance programs. The study
found a statistically significant reduction in crime in only one of the thirteen
Redwood City, California, crime rates dropped eleven percent in the first year and thirty-three
percent in the second year after cameras were installed. Id. at 147-48.
15. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHO's WATCHING? VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE
IN NEW YORK CITY AND THE NEED FOR PUBLIC OVERSIGHT 5 (2006) [hereinafter WHo's
WATCHING?].
16. Id.
17. Id. A commanding officer of the NYPD's Technical Assistance Response Unit
reported that the VIPER program had placed 3,100 cameras in fifteen public housing build-
ings managed and monitored by the NYPD and the New York City Housing Authority in
1997.
18. Id.
19. Zaheer Cassim, Public Housing Residents Happy with Close Surveillance, THE
UPTOWNER (Oct. 13, 2010), http://theuptowner.org/2010/10/13/public-housing-residents-
happy-with-close-surveillance.
20. WHO'S WATCHING?, supra note 15, at 5.
21. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-748, UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE: VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: INFORMATION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT'S USE
OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION TO MONITOR SELECTED FEDERAL PROPERTY IN WASHING-
TON, D.C. (2003).
22. Id. at 3 (listing Baltimore, Maryland; Tampa, Florida; Columbia, South Carolina;
and Virginia Beach, Virginia).
23. Id. at 29 ("There is general consensus among CCTV users, privacy advocates, re-
searchers, and CCTV industry groups that there are few evaluations of the effectiveness of
CCTV in reducing crime, and few jurisdictions are keeping data to demonstrate that their
CCTV systems are effective.").
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areas under surveillance, and seven areas had actually experienced increased
crime.24
In addition to the doubts with regard to the effectiveness of surveillance
cameras in preventing everyday crime, there is also a lack of evidence sup-
porting the position that surveillance cameras prevent terrorism. 5 While
there are video recordings of some of the actions of the September 11th hi-
jackers prior to the attacks, those video cameras were unable to prevent the
attacks.26 Likewise, London's "ring of steel" video surveillance program in
its public transport system also failed to prevent the deaths of fifty-six peo-
ple in the July 2005 terrorist attacks.27 As Business Week sharply pointed
out, following the 2005 attacks in London:
Lost in the recent London bombings, along with innocent lives, was
any illusion that today's surveillance technology can save us from
evildoers. Britain has 4 million video cameras monitoring streets,
parks, and government buildings, more than any other country.
London alone has 500,000 cameras watching for signs of illicit ac-
tivity . . . . Fanatics bent on suicide aren't fazed by cameras. And
even if they are known terrorists, most video surveillance software
won't pick them out anyway.28
Cameras capture events, and in some cases those images will later help
investigators identify the perpetrators of criminal acts. But cameras are by
no means a magic bullet. Highlighting the need to prioritize uses of limited
resources in New York City, the NYCLU has recognized that "[c]ameras
cannot prevent bad things from happening-and the money spent on them
may, in fact, divert resources from more effective crime prevention strate-
gies and tactics." 29
II. THE STATE OF THE CITY
A. The Lower Manhattan and Midtown Manhattan Security Initiatives
Effective or not, video surveillance appears to be with New Yorkers to
stay. In 2007, New York launched the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative
(LMSI), which includes an integrated network of publicly and privately
24. MARTIN GILL & ANGELA SPRIGGS, HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY 292, As-
SESSING THE IMPACT OF CCTV, at vi (2005), available at https://www.cetvusergroup.com/
downloads/file/Martin%20gill.pdf; WHO's WATCHING?, supra note 15, at 6.
25. WHO'S WATCHING?, supra note 15, at 6.
26. Sewell Chan, U.S. Transit Agencies Turn to Cameras in Terror Flight, but Systems
Vary in Effectiveness, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2005, at Al.
27. WHO'S WATCHING?, supra note 15, at 6.
28. Catherine Yang, The State of Surveillance, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 8,
2005), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_32/b3946001_mzOOI.htm.
29. WHO'S WATCHING?, supra note 15, at 6.
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owned cameras, as well as license plate readers, concentrated below 14th
Street.3 0 In 2010, the city launched a companion program-the Midtown
Manhattan Security Initiative (MMSI).3 ' Presently, the City is continuously
scanning at least 1,159 public and private cameras; it has added 500 new
cameras to subway systems in the city and has plans to add approximately
1,800 more image-capturing devices in lower and midtown Manhattan.3 2
These cameras record the images of many New Yorkers, multiple times per
day." The purpose of LMSIIMMSI is a compelling one: to "aid in the detec-
tion of preparations to conduct terrorist attacks,"34 to "deter terrorist
attacks,"35 and to "reduce incident response times."36 The programs are run
by the NYPD's Counterterrorism Bureau, with primary financial support
and some operational oversight from the federal Department of Homeland
Security. 37 Distinct in purpose, function, and management from the NYPD's
anti-crime programs like VIPER, LMSI/MMSI was created solely to keep
New York City safe from future terrorist attacks.38
The LMSI area of surveillance extends from Canal Street to the lowest
point in Manhattan, and from the East River to the Hudson River.39 The
MMSI area of surveillance reaches from 30th Street to 60th Street, river to
30. Cara Buckley, Police Plan Web of Surveillance for Downtown, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2007, at AO.
31. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg, Police Commissioner
Kelly, and MTA Chairman Walder Activate Security Cameras Inside Times Square, Penn
Station, and Grand Central Subway Stations as Part of NYPD's Midtown Manhattan Security
Initiative (Sept. 20, 2010), available at http://www.nyc.gov/portal/site/nycgov/
menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2fl c701 c789a0/index.jsp?pagelD=mayor...pressjrelease&catlD
=1 194&docname=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2010b%2Fp
r399- 10.html&cc=unusedl 978&rc= I1194&ndi=1 [hereinafter Mayor's Office Press Release].
32. Id.
33. Brad Hamilton, Hidden Eyes of Our Apple; No Escaping City Security Cameras,
N.Y. POST (May 2, 2004), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/hidden-eyes-of-our-apple-no-
escapingGPFusGUurrtlWFF4Pb6ufM ("To see just how often the average New Yorker is
caught on film, a Post reporter spent the day gathering images from some of the 200 or so
cameras he passed during a typical Tuesday on the job. It started early-at 9:51 a.m., when he
got coffee at the deli around the corner from his Carroll Gardens, Brooklyn, apartment. About
an hour later, he was captured driving on the BQE at Sackett Street by a Department of Trans-
portation traffic cam[era]. From there, he was spotted almost constantly: walking into the
newspaper's building on Sixth Avenue in Midtown, riding the elevator to his office, meeting a
source in Times Square, talking on the street, eating lunch, taking the subway, having a drink
with a pal, renting a DVD. A mix of public and private cameras tracked him moment by mo-
ment doing a host of mundane activities.").
34. New York City, N.Y, N.Y.C. Police Dep't Pub. Sec. Privacy Guidelines (Apr. 2,
2009), available at http://pnl-prd-web.nyc.gov/htmllnypd/downloads/pdf/crime-prevention/
public.securityprivacy-guidelines.pdf [hereinafter NYPD Guidelines].
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.
37. Anonymous Interview, supra note 9.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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river.40 The programs consist of a fiber optic ring around Manhattan that
carries the data collected from all of the cameras currently in the network.4'
Through the Lower Manhattan Security Coordination Center, video feeds
are pulled in from multiple sources, including NYPD-owned wireless
cameras in "high risk" areas (such as the Financial District), "Stakeholder"-
owned cameras (private sector "stakeholders" include Goldman Sachs, the
New York Stock Exchange, and the Manhattan Transportation Authority),
license plate readers, and 911 reports.42 Personnel from the NYPD, Port Au-
thority, and stakeholder entities all monitor these video feeds and other
sources from within the Coordination Center.43
What makes LMSI/MMSI unique-and distinguished from the "ring of
steel" and other surveillance programs-is that it allows the use of "real-
time video analytics."" All cameras in the two programs are networked to
one dedicated fiber optic ring; one data center processes and stores all of the
video footage gathered by the cameras. 45 These characteristics make the
network useful for both investigative purposes and-of most interest to the
NYPD and its stakeholders-preventative purposes as well. 46 The term "re-
al-time video analytics" refers to a programmable network, which can be
built to recognize and flag-in real-time-scenarios such as abandoned
packages in the subway.47 According to the Mayor's office, when fully con-
figured, the analytics can alert police in real-time to a variety of potentially
suspicious objects or activities, including unattended parcels, movement in
restricted areas, and unusual loitering, and enables investigators to search
multiple cameras simultaneously to retrieve incidents of concern.4 8 What the
Mayor's office has not addressed are questions about the system's operation
and the lack of enforceable guidelines to limit potential abuse.
B. Public Security Privacy Guidelines
In 2009, the NYPD released a set of Public Security Privacy Guidelines
("Guidelines") that purportedly established "policies and procedures to limit
the authorized use of the Domain Awareness System and to provide for lim-
ited access to and proper disposition of stored data" and to ensure "privacy
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.; Mayor's Office Press Release, supra note 31.
43. Mayor's Office Press Release, supra note 31.
44. Anonymous Interview, supra note 9.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. London's "ring of steel" is distinguished because it is decentralized, not moni-
tored in real-time, and therefore only useful for post-incident investigations. In the event of an
incident, the footage from each camera must be viewed and analyzed separately and manually.
48. Mayor's Office Press Release, supra note 31.
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protections."4 9 The NYPD adopted the Guidelines, taking into consideration
the "magnitude" of the new system, the large amounts of time, effort and
funding that would be invested in new camera technology and
implementation of the system, as well as "valid concerns about these sys-
tems, governing retention, use, and sharing of video data."5 0 The Guidelines
note that the Domain Awareness System, which encompasses the LMSI and
the MMSI, was created under the NYPD's plenary power to protect the pub-
lic, set out in New York City's Charter."' The key objectives of the Domain
Awareness System, according to the Guidelines, are to: observe the pre-
operational activity of terrorist organizations; detect preparations to conduct
terrorist attacks; deter terrorist attacks; provide "a degree of common do-
main awareness" for all of the stakeholders in the LMSI/MMSI; reduce
incident response times; and "create a common technological infrastructure
to support the integration of new security technology."52
The Guidelines set out directives aimed at preventing privacy violations
that focus on the operation of the system and on the storage, usage, and
sharing of data.53 Generally, operators of the surveillance system are com-
pelled to refrain from biased targeting, to monitor only areas in which no
reasonable expectation of privacy exists, to refrain from the use of facial
recognition technology, and to require identifying signs on NYPD- and
stakeholder-owned cameras. 54 Additionally, the Guidelines state that their
provisions are to be extended to cases where technologies governed by the
Guidelines either utilize or are integrated with systems deployed by other
divisions of the NYPD.5 5 Regarding data, videos are to be stored for only
thirty days under ordinary circumstances, and data is to be destroyed after
that period.5 1 Other types of data, however, may be held for up to five years,
or even indefinitely.57 Decisions to retain data beyond the thirty-day period
must be made by an "Authorized Agent," typically either the Deputy Com-
missioner of Counterterrorism or the Deputy Commissioner for Legal
49. NYPD Guidelines, supra note 34 at 1-2 (The "Domain Awareness System" refers
to the city's video surveillance system, specifically, "NYPD-owned and Stakeholder-owned
closed circuit television cameras (CCTVs) providing feeds into the Lower Manhattan Security
Coordination Center; License Plate Readers (LPRs); and other domain awareness devices, as
appropriate.").
50. Anonymous Interview, supra note 9.
51. NYPD Guidelines, supra note 34, at 1; 18 N.Y.C. CHARTER § 435(a) (2011).
52. NYPD Guidelines, supra note 34, at 2-3.
53. Id. at 3-6.
54. Id. at 3.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 3-4.
57. Id. at 2, 4 (Data covered in the Guidelines, other than video data, is described as
"Metadata," "information about data . .. that increases the usefulness of that data"; "LPR
Data," "license plate data collected by fixed or mobile LPR devices"; and "Environmental
Data," "environmental data collected by devices designed to detect hazards related to potential
terrorist threats, or to respond to terrorist attacks.").
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Matters." "Data usage" is authorized to further the purposes set out by the
Guidelines, as well as "in furtherance of legitimate law enforcement and
public safety purposes beyond the scope of those purposes set out in the
Statement of Purpose."59 The Guidelines state that it is the NYPD's policy
"to place limits on the sharing of data with third parties" and to ensure that
data is used only for law enforcement purposes.' Once again, only an Au-
thorized Agent may approve the sharing of data.61 Finally, the Guidelines
provide security protocols to safeguard stored data by limiting access to the
Lower Manhattan Security Coordination Center, screening stakeholder rep-
resentatives, and requiring both NYPD personnel and stakeholder
representatives to "complete privacy training ... with periodic assess-
ments."62
The Guidelines state that the system will be operated "only in further-
ance of legitimate law. enforcement and public safety purposes"63 and
express concern for the public's interest in privacy."' However, the NYPD
and the Guidelines make it clear that "flexibility" is required to protect the
public, and are very unclear with regard to how much and what type of 11ex-
ibility is required. 65 Regarding both operations and the treatment of data, the
Guidelines set out general requirements, but leave substantial room for
changes in ordinary operation, with imprecise regulations regarding how
such decisions are to be made. For instance, one objective of the Domain
Awareness System is to provide infrastructure to support the integration of
new security technology, but the possible types of new technology are unde-
fined; and, while the Guidelines state that facial recognition technology will
not be deployed, it is not clear that this assurance will be lasting.66 Further,
technologies governed by the Guidelines may utilize or be integrated with
systems and technologies that go undefined, deployed by other bureaus and
divisions of the NYPD that also remain undefined.67 Of overarching concern
is the fact that the Guidelines allow data to be used for indeterminate "legit-
imate law enforcement and public safety purposes" beyond the scope of the
Statement of Purpose.6 8 This effectively means that data may be used for
any purpose identified by the NYPD to relate to law enforcement, but not
encompassed in the Guidelines. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the
Guidelines appears in the final paragraph: a disclaimer that states,
58. Id. at 3-4.
59. Id. at 4.
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 6-7.
63. Id. at 4.
64. Id. at 1.
65. Anonymous Interview, supra note 9.
66. NYPD Guidelines, supra note 34, at 3.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 4.
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"[n]othing in these Guidelines is intended to create any private rights, privi-
leges, benefits or causes of action in law or equity."69 Thus, the Guidelines
are not legally enforceable.
To date, the federal government and state governments have not adopted
any legislation governing the video surveillance of public places.o In 2010,
Senator Arlen Specter introduced a bill that would have placed some limits
on lawful public video surveillance, but the bill never passed out of commit-
tee.7 ' The bill itself would not have gone very far to address public privacy
concerns resulting from video surveillance in public spaces. Rather, it fo-
cused on surveillance of an individual's place of residence-a location long
understood by courts to enjoy a high level of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.7 2 The bill would simply have amended the federal criminal code "to
prohibit unauthorized video surveillance of an individual in an area of a
temporary or permanent residence that is not readily observable from a pub-
lic location, with a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area."73 It would
also have generally prohibited the use of such surveillance as evidence.74
The bill may yet come up for a vote: to date, it has been read twice in ses-
sion and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.75
Outside of legislation, while courts in the United States have addressed
numerous surveillance issues,76 they have not specifically addressed video
surveillance in public areas. Local governments too have generally not regu-
lated video surveillance programs. At least one survey has shown that most
large police departments in the United States do not have written policies
regulating the use of video systems.77 This is pointed to by proponents of the
NYPD's system, which has been applauded for voluntarily adopting a policy
on privacy and abuse.78 While New York City does have a policy, the policy
as adopted provides no legally enforceable cause of action,79 and the NYPD
69. Id. at 7.
70. Jeremy Brown, Pan, Tilt, Zoom: Regulating the Use of Video Surveillance of Public
Places, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 755, 760 (2008) (citing Thomas D. Colbridge, Electronic
Surveillance: A Matter ofNecessity, FBI L. Enforcement Bull., Feb. 2000, at 26).
71. Surreptitious Video Surveillance Act of 2010, S. 3214, 11 th Cong. (2010).
72. See, e.g., Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (acknowledging an individual's reason-
able expectation of privacy at home).
73. S. 3214.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., 476 U.S.
227 (1985); Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
77. Thomas J. Nestel Ill, Using Surveillance Camera Systems to Monitor Public Do-
mains: Can Abuse Be Prevented? 20 (March 2006) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=461595.
78. Anonymous Interview, supra note 9.
79. NYPD Guidelines, supra note 34, at 7.
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has attempted to avoid making background information about that policy
available to the public at large.80
C. Freedom of Information
In 2007, the NYCLU filed Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)" and
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)8 2 requests with the NYPD and the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS), in an attempt to draw a picture for
the public of how the City's video surveillance system is being implemented
and operated.8 3 The NYCLU sought the following information: the types of
data the NYPD was planning to collect through the LMSI, how the data
would be used, whether and how the data would be shared with other law
enforcement agencies or other entities, the forms in which the data would be
retained, and the length of time the data would be retained. 84 The NYPD
initially responded to the NYCLU's request for documents by sending one
document, and asserting that the rest of the documents sought "were either
exempt from disclosure or could not be located."" Following an administra-
tive appeal, eighty-eight additional documents were disclosed-mostly
budgetary worksheets and funding requests." The remaining undisclosed
documents, by the NYPD's own calculations, totaled more than 2,100 pages
and were found to be exempt from disclosure in the administrative appeal."
80. See N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, No. 112145/08, 2009 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 2542 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 26, 2009).
81. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84-90 (McKinney 2010).
82. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.A § 552 (West 2012).
83 N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2542; see also N.Y. Civil
Liberties Union v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 771 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09-
CV-5325).
84. N. Y. Civil Liberties Union, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2542 at *3.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *3-4.
87. Id. at *4-5. In the administrative hearing, the documents requested by the NYCLU
were found to be exempt from disclosure under the following:
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(a) (McKinney 2010) (exempts from disclosure records
whose disclosure is otherwise barred by state or federal statutes); N.Y. PUB. OF. LAW
§ 87(2)(e)(i) (McKinney 2010) (exempts from disclosure records that are compiled for
law enforcement purposes); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(e)(iv) (McKinney 2010) (ex-
empts records which, if disclosed, would interfere with law enforcement
investigations or judicial proceedings, or reveal criminal investigative techniques or
procedures, except routine techniques and procedures); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(f)
(McKinney 2010) (exempts from disclosure records whose disclosure could endanger
the life or safety of a person); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(g) (McKinney 2010)
(exempts from disclosure inter-agency and intra-agency communications which are
pre-decisional and deliberative); and, N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(i) (McKinney
2010) (exempts from disclosure records that, if disclosed, would jeopardize an agen-
cy's capacity to guarantee the security of its information technology assets, such assets
encompassing both electronic information systems and infrastructures).
Id.
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In 2008, the NYCLU sought judicial review of the NYPD's avoidance
of the NYCLU's 2007 FOIL request for documents related to the LMSI. 8 In
2009, Justice Marylin Diamond of the New York State Supreme Court or-
dered the NYPD to disclose further documents, but upheld the exemption of
any documents involving "the operational details of the LMSI, such as the
types of information to be collected and how the information will be used,
shared and stored and for how long" under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(e).89
The court expressed concern that such disclosure would limit the effective-
ness of the program and increase the risk of terrorist attacks in New York
City.' The court responded to the NYCLU's request relating to funds re-
ceived for the program and communications with vendors by ordering the
production of documents for in camera review.'
On October 27, 2010, Justice Diamond filed a ruling.92 With respect to
documents classified as inter-agency and intra-agency communications, Jus-
tice Diamond ruled in favor of the NYPD, allowing such documents to be
withheld from the NYCLU and, by extension, from the public.93 The cumu-
lative result of Justice Diamond's 2009 and 2010 rulings exempted from
disclosure all documents that address operational details of the LMSI (such
as the types of information to be collected, how such information will be
used, shared and stored, and for how long), as well as any communications
within and between agencies involved in the LMSI (which could include
entities ranging from the NYPD to Goldman Sachs, a LMSI/MMSI stake-
holder). With respect to all other documents, Justice Diamond did rule in
favor of the NYCLU, ordering the NYPD to produce the requested docu-
ments.94 To date, the NYPD has complied with the order, producing a series
of documents that the NYCLU has been able to make use of in its advocacy
work.95 The NYCLU has had more success in retrieving documents from
DHS in federal court, but, particularly in the absence of documents shedding
light on the operation of LMSI/MMSI, or the communications between
stakeholders in establishing the programs, the NYCLU has expressed con-
tinued concerns regarding the opacity in the management and operation of
the LMSI and its progeny.96
88. Id. at *1.
89. Id. at *9-10.
90. Id. at *10.
91. Id. at *12.
92. N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, No. 112145 (N.Y. App. Div.
Oct. 27, 2010).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. E-mail from Chris Dunn, Assoc. Legal Dir. of the N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, to
author (Jan. 17, 2012, 1:44:29 PM EST) (on file with author).
96. N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2542 at
*12; see also Jen Chung, NYCLU Wants Details on NYPD's Lower Manhattan Security
Plans, THE GOTHAMIST (Sept. 9, 2008, 5:33 PM), http://gothamist.com/2008/09/09/
nyclu-wantsdetails-on-nypds-lower.php; Andrew Grossman, With New Subway Cameras,
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D. A Comparison: Surveillance Law in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has led the way in the adoption of video surveil-
lance systems, and is cited often in relationship to emergent surveillance
systems in the United States-notably, the LMSI/MMSI programs in New
York City. As such, it is useful to consider the legal regime that regulates
video surveillance in Britain, and to note that it does not differ substantially
from our own legal regulation (and lack thereof) of video surveillance (alt-
hough Parliament is in the process of considering a bill to increase civil
liberties protections, which is discussed below).97 A commonly cited statistic
is that the United Kingdom deploys one surveillance camera for every four-
teen citizens, and that the average citizen may be filmed up to 300 times per
day; the United Kingdom is one of the top five most heavily surveilled
countries in the world.98 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
(RIPA)," the Police Act of 1997,"o and the Intelligence Services Act of
1994 all compel the regulation of various surveillance methods in the United
Kingdom.o'0 This combination of statutes acts very much like the suite of
federal legislation that governs surveillance in the United States: the
PATRIOT Act,'O2 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,o 3 the Com-
munications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act," and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. 0 5 On both sides of the Atlantic, these collec-
tions of legislation establish guidelines for surveillance activities, and
generally provide the governments of the United States and the United
Kingdom broad latitude in conducting surveillance of both citizens and non-
citizens.
an Attempt to Recreate "Ring of Steel" in Manhattan, WALL ST. J. METROPOLIS BLOG (Sept.
20, 2010, 5:26 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2010/09/20/with-new-subway-cameras-
an-attempt-to-recreate-ring-of-steel-in-midtown.
97. Protection of Freedoms Bill, 2010-12, H.L. Bill [128] (Eng.) (introducing a code of
practice for surveillance camera systems, among other provisions).
98. Britain is "Surveillance Society," BBC NEws (Nov. 2, 2006), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/6108496.stm; Tom Kelly, Revealed: Big Brother Britain Has
More CCTV Cameras than China, DAILY MAIL (Aug. I1, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-1205607/Shock-figures-reveal-Britain-CCTV-camera- 14-people--China.html;
Sarah Lyall, Britons Weary of Surveillance in Minor Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/world/europe/25surveillance.html?pagewanted=all.
99. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, S.I. 2000/23 (U.K.).
100. Police Act, 1997, S.I. 1997/50 (U.K.).
101. Intelligence Services Act, 1994, S.I. 1994/13 (U.K.).
102. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001 ) (codified in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.).
103. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522).
104. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Pub. L. No. 103-
414, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994).
105. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 36).
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Notably, the United Kingdom's legal framework on surveillance also re-
sembles the law of the United States insofar as it lacks regulations that
directly address public video surveillance. Parliament, however, is in the
process of considering a bill aimed at "safeguard[ing] civil liberties and re-
duc[ing] the burden of government intrusion into the lives of individuals."' 6
The Protection of Freedoms Bill was introduced into the House of Com-
mons in February 2011, and according to the Home Office, is expected to
complete the parliamentary process and receive Royal Assent by the end of
the current session in April 2012.107 As part of its provisions, the Bill would
require the Secretary of State to promulgate a Code of Practice governing
video surveillance and would establish a Surveillance Camera Commission-
er, charged with "encouraging compliance with the surveillance camera
code, reviewing the operation of the code, and providing advice about the
code.""os The Code of Practice, which will be adopted if Parliament passes
the Protection of Freedoms Bill, resembles the NYPD's Public Security Pri-
vacy Guidelines in the privacy issues that it reaches (including technical
specifications, retention of and access to data, and privacy training for per-
sonnel).'" Unlike the Guidelines, however, the Code of Practice will be
statutory and thus legally binding."o
While the Code of Practice, if implemented, will be legally binding,
the Protection of Freedoms Bill sets out only vague and quite flexible pro-
visions for the drafting of the code, and also has limited geographical and
jurisdictional reach. The Bill does not mandate precisely what systems and
uses must be addressed by the code. The code "must contain guidance
about one or more of . .. the development or use of surveillance camera
systems" or the "use or processing" of information obtained through those
systems."' Additionally, regulations under the Code of Practice will govern
only police and local governments, despite the fact that the use of video sur-
veillance is more widespread."' Further, the draft document provided to the
public for comment expresses a commitment to "restoring and preserving
[the United Kingdom's] historic and valued traditions of freedom and fair-
ness," " but notes that "a cornerstone of a free and confident society is the
State's duty to ensure that its citizens are sufficiently protected so that they
are able to conduct their legitimate business in safety and security."" 4 To
106. Protection of Freedoms Bill, 2010-12, H.L. Bill [128] (Eng.).
107. Id.
108. Id. cl. 29-38; accord S.A. Mathieson, CCTV and ANPR to Get Commissioner and
Code, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/government-computing-
network/201 1/feb/l I/cctv-commissioner-code-anpr-freedoms-bill.
109. Protection of Freedoms Bill, 2010-12, H.L. Bill [128] cl. 29(3) (Eng.).
110. Id. cl. 29(1).
i1. Id. cl. 29(2).
112. Id. cl. 33(5); Mathieson, supra note 108.
113. Id. at 3.
114. Id.
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that end, the Code asserts that nothing in it is intended to "hamper the abil-
ity of the law enforcement agencies or any other organisation, to use [video
surveillance technology] as necessary to prevent or detect crime, or other-
wise help to ensure the safety and security of individuals.""' Much like the
NYPD's Guidelines, the Code of Practice aims to ensure the utmost flexibil-
ity to agencies engaging in video surveillance. Finally, of concern to critics
of the Bill is the fact that individuals who fail to follow the code will face
neither civil nor criminal charges."16
As in the United States, the authority of British national, regional, and
local governments to conduct any type of surveillance is subject to a "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" standard.1 7 The definition of a reasonable
expectation of privacy anywhere except in the home remains as uncertain in
the United Kingdom as it does in the United States." 8 A key difference be-
tween the laws of the United Kingdom and the United States, however, is
that the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in the United Kingdom
does not stem from national law; rather, it comes from the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR), to which the United Kingdom is subject,
along with the rest of the European Union."9 Article 8 of the ECHR pro-
vides that "everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence" and prohibits government interference
with this right,
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
115. Id.
116. Protection of Freedoms Bill, 2010-12, H.L. Bill [128] cl. 33(2) (Eng.); Mathieson,
supra note 108.
117. Peck v. U.K., 2003-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 57; Monica Bhogal, United Kingdom Privacy
Update 2003, 1 SCRIPT-ED 205, 211 (2004), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/
script-ed/docs/privacy.pdf; Clare Feikert & Charles Doyle, Anti-Terrorism Authority Under
the Laws of the United Kingdom and the United States, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS 17 (Sep. 7,
2006), available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33726.pdf.
118. In the United Kingdom, see THE ROYAL ACAD. OF ENG'G, DILEMMAS OF PRIVACY
AND SURVEILLANCE CHALLENGES OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 32 (2007), available at
http://www.raeng.org.uk/news/publications/list/reports/dilemmasfoLprivacy-and-surveillanc
e-report.pdf ("There is need for clarification of the notion of a 'reasonable expectation of
privacy' in order that the right to privacy is better understood and better protected."). In the
United States, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information "knowingly ex-
posed" to a third party, but while certain data has been established as knowingly exposed, the
full spectrum of privacy from knowing exposure to reasonable expectation of privacy is not
clearly defined. See, e.g., Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (acknowledging an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy at home); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding
that the installation and use of a "pen register" is not a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment); U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not protect bank account information divulged to banks by account holders).
119. Feikert, supra note 17, at 14.
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disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.120
While Article 8 leaves room for a wide range of government actions in the
interest of security and safety, to date the European Court of Human Rights
has construed the article somewhat protectively in favor of individual priva-
cy rights.121
In Europe, there appears to be more room than in the United States for
protections against privacy violations that occur in public. The European
Court of Human Rights has identified a "zone of interaction of a person with
others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of 'private
life.' "122 In the 2003 case Peck v. The United Kingdom,123 for example, the
Court firmly expressed the principle that, under certain circumstances, an
individual's actions in a public place may retain a reasonable expectation of
privacy, despite taking place in public.'24 In Peck, the claimant was filmed
on a surveillance camera and still images from the surveillance footage were
later released to the media. Peck's application for judicial review in the
United Kingdom was rejected on the grounds that there was no general right
of privacy under English law.125 Peck then brought his claim to the European
Court of Human Rights, which ruled that the disclosure of footage constitut-
ed a disproportionate interference with Peck's private life-a term construed
broadly under Article 8 of the ECHR-and the fact that the footage was tak-
en on a public street was not sufficient to preclude it from being considered
a private situation.126 The Peck ruling and others like it are significantly dif-
ferent from the jurisprudence of the United States, which, to date, has found
no reasonable expectation of privacy in public under any circumstances.127
In practice, the construction of privacy rights by the European Court of
Human Rights may not grant substantially greater privacy protections to the
average British citizen than is afforded to the average American citizen.
Peck is a substantially limited ruling, based on unique circumstances involv-
ing a highly mentally-disturbed claimant on the street at night, with a
privacy claim based not on the government's act of filming him, but rather
on its subsequent act of releasing stills from the footage. Further, any
120. The European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 5.
121. Bhogal, supra note 117.
122. P.G. and J.H. v. U.K., 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 56-57.
123. Peck v. U.K., 2003-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 57.
124. Id. at §§ 62, 63.
125. Id. at § 32 (citing the High Court of England and Wales, which noted that there is
no general right of privacy recognized by English law).
126. Id. §§ 62, 63, 85.
127. U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) ("A person travelling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one
place to another."); Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.").
Spring 2012]1 605
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
individual wishing to challenge the government's video surveillance practic-
es can rely only on the ECHR and litigation in the European Court of
Human Rights. Just as an American citizen must have resources and stamina
to bring an individual privacy claim, so too must a British citizen summon
the same wherewithal to bring a claim to the European Court of Human
Rights. While the European law may prove to be somewhat more protective
of individual privacy rights, the path to judicial review may not be more
readily available than the path to judicial review in the United States.
III. SECURITY VERSUS PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH
A. Painting a Picture
The NYCLU demanded documents from the NYPD to develop a picture
of the policies in place (or lack thereof) governing New York City's video
surveillance programs, so as to be able to effectively monitor and respond to
potential abuses and violations of the system.'28 The lack of legally
enforceable guidelines and/or any governing legislation raises major con-
cerns having to do with privacy protections, as well as First Amendment
rights. Some of these privacy concerns relate to the length of time that the
NYPD may keep footage from the video surveillance system and regula-
tions regarding how and under what circumstances such footage may be
shared between departments, between stakeholders, and even between state
and federal law enforcement entities. Further concerns deal with basic pri-
vacy issues-how far into individuals' lives video cameras may probe-and
the possible chilling effect of such surveillance upon New Yorkers' speech.
The Guidelines set out a range of operational procedures. However, with no
possibility of legal enforcement, these procedures do not provide strong pro-
tections against law enforcement overstepping its bounds.
There is no obvious legal argument to challenge the omnipresence and
expansion of surveillance cameras in New York City. As Chris Dunn, Asso-
ciate Legal Director of the NYCLU, puts it, "I know of no plans by any
organization to litigate the presence of surveillance cameras in New York,
and you can read into that the absence of a good legal argument against
them."'2 9 There has been no domestic litigation regarding the overarching
legality of public video surveillance.130 The lack of such litigation seems to
reflect and affirm the view that systems such as the LMSI/MMSI cannot be
facially challenged. That is, the system, on its face, does not violate the
United States Constitution, nor does it violate any federal or state statute.
Any challenge would have to be to a specific application of the system-a
128. Dunn Interview, supra note 12, at 1.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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specific instance of overreach or abuse."' However, in other contexts courts
have acted to place certain limits on the reach of different types of surveil-
lance, and these limitations help illustrate where boundaries and possible
overreaching may be identifiable with regard to video surveillance, laying
groundwork for possible legal challenges to particular practices.
Any potential legal arguments challenging public video surveillance
programs would have to be grounded primarily in the Fourth Amendment,13 2
and potentially in the First Amendment as well.' 33 With regard to the Fourth
Amendment, there are three notable, relevant boundaries that the judiciary
has placed on surveillance practices through case law, offering some guid-
ance as to the limits of constitutional video surveillance.' 34 First, public
video surveillance cameras may not be used to monitor spaces in which in-
dividuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy.'35 Second, police may
not use zoom lenses to magnify individuals, belongings, or activity to an
invasive degree without a warrant. 136 Third, police may not use cameras to
conduct extensive surveillance without suspicion.137 While these three
guidelines are broad, and in some cases come from Supreme Court dicta,
they at least set out possible boundaries to consider in the absence of clear
standards. The First Amendment may provide additional support for a chal-
lenge. Constitutional concerns would relate to the potential chilling effect on
freedom of speech and association that could result from surveillance prac-
tices.
131. The Supreme Court, in considering constitutional challenges to legislation, distin-
guishes between facial challenges, which assert that "no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act [in question] would be valid," U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), and
"as applied" challenges, which challenge the validity of legislation only as applied to the chal-
lenger's particular actions or circumstances, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
462 (1978).
132. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
133. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
134. Brown, supra note 70, at 767.
135. See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
protects individuals who have an expectation of privacy that is recognized as reasonable by
society).
136. See Dow Chem. Co. v. U.S., 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1985) (suggesting that zoom-
ing in with a video camera to a certain point might become so invasive as to require a
warrant).
137. See U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1983) (finding that a radio transmitter
attached to defendant's property that indicated defendant's location to law enforcement offic-
ers did not constitute an unlawful search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but
suggesting that systems that make possible "twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen" and
"dragnet-type law enforcement practices" could potentially raise Fourth Amendment con-
cerns).
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B. Video Abuse
New York City history reveals prevalent opportunities for abusive prac-
tices in video surveillance, including violations of privacy, chilling of free
speech, and discrimination. The fact that the NYPD's Guidelines are not
legally enforceable, combined with the lack of any official acknowledge-
ment of-or commitment to move away from-past practices, strengthens
civil liberties advocates' view that abusive practices are likely to be repeat-
ed, and will go unnoticed and unchallenged in many cases."'
New York City's history of abusive surveillance practices dramatically
highlights the importance of public knowledge of video surveillance pro-
grams and the guidelines surrounding their implementation and use by the
NYPD. The abuses made possible by video surveillance may seem obvious
and unnecessarily re-hashed here. But it is important to take into account the
human impact of such incidents, to make the consequences tangible. As
Chris Dunn explains, until the public has a clear understanding of the priva-
cy threat imposed by video surveillance, there is little possibility that more
stringent regulations will materialize.139
The NYPD emphasizes a distinction between its anti-crime surveillance
programs and its Counterterrorism Bureau's LMSI/MMSI program, imply-
ing that the Counterterrorism Bureau's program is better monitored and
more tightly controlled to prevent abuses.'40 That the Guidelines were vol-
untarily adopted has been promoted as evidence of the NYPD's recognition
of the "magnitude" of the new surveillance programs, and its commitment
to "respecting" the public's privacy concerns.141 The NYPD also admittedly
anticipated challenges to the system and aimed to create, in the Guidelines,
a framework for "the responsible use of such a system." 42 However, as
much as we may wish to ascribe only good will and good faith to our law
enforcement officers, the reality is that they may make mistakes.
A National Institute of Justice study shows that law enforcement offic-
ers can have trouble concentrating on surveillance monitors after they have
138. See generally WHO'S WATCHING?. supra note 15 (asserting that New York City's
video surveillance activities, and the lack of legally enforceable regulations of those activities,
create a law enforcement climate in which abuses will be replicated, and that without legal
checks to the system, many abuses will go unnoticed and unaddressed, because individuals
will not be sufficiently informed or empowered to challenge them).
139. Dunn Interview, supra note 12, at 1.
140. Anonymous Interview, supra note 9 (noting that all personnel in the coordination
center are required to take a three-hour privacy training course that the NYPD developed
specifically for using the Domain Awareness System); see also NYPD Guidelines, supra note
34, at 6-7 (providing that all stakeholder representatives and NYPD personnel are required to
complete a privacy training "based, in part, upon a curriculum covering the proper use and
handling of such information, with periodic assessments").
141. Anonymous Interview, supra note 9.
142. Id.
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been watching for more than twenty minutes,143 resulting in possible slips in
diligence, or unethical actions born of boredom. Even assuming nothing but
good intentions on the part of New York City police officers, there can be no
mistaking the fact that incidents of abuse can and do occur. LMSIIMMSI is
run out of the same police department as anti-crime surveillance programs,
and is staffed primarily by New York City police officers.'" It is therefore
reasonable to use VIPER and other related programs as at least an illustra-
tion of some of the possible consequences of police video surveillance
programs in New York City.
1. Privacy
During the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York, a
NYPD helicopter, equipped with an infrared camera, was tasked with moni-
toring a mass bicycle ride protest through downtown Manhattan.145 During
the course of their duties, the police officers controlling the helicopter also
recorded a couple being intimate on an apartment terrace, for nearly four
minutes.146 The recording became public when it was used in the trial of one
of the protesting bikers, and it was eventually aired by the local CBS sta-
tion.147 Jeffrey Rosner, one of the filmed individuals, said following the
incident (and after filing a complaint) that he tended to be in favor of sur-
veillance, but that he was concerned with "the sensibility that the police
think it's O.K. that they do that-it's about their own professionalism."' 48
In addition to such a remarkable incident, the use of surveillance cam-
eras has everyday privacy implications. Many of the cameras in New York
City, especially prior to the LMSI/MMSI programs, have been set up to be
un-manned, static monitors, which can be referred back to in case of an in-
cident. Others, however, even prior to LMSI/MMSI, have been run and
monitored in real time by police officers, leaving these cameras to be espe-
cially potent potential tools of misuse. As reported by the Associated Press,
143. The National Institute of Justice has reported on experiments that were run "to test
the effectiveness of an individual whose task was to sit in front of a video monitor(s) for sev-
eral hours a day and watch for particular events. These studies demonstrated that such a task,
even when assigned to a person who is dedicated and well-intentioned, will not support an
effective security system. After only twenty minutes of watching and evaluating monitor
screens, the attention of most individuals has degenerated to well below acceptable levels."
MARY W. GREEN, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE APPROPRIATE AND EFFECTIVE USE OF SECU-
RITY TECHNOLOGIES IN U.S. SCHOOLS: A GUIDE FOR SCHOOLS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES, 30 (1999), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/school/home.html.
144. Anonymous Interview, supra note 9; NYPD Press Release, supra note 8.
145. Jim Dwyer, Police Video Caught a Couple's Intimate Moment on a Manhattan
Rooftop, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at B10; NYCLU Decries NYPD Abuse of Infrared Cam-
eras During RNC, N.Y. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 24, 2005), http://www.nyclu.org/news/
nyclu-decries-nypd-abuse-of-infrared-cameras-duing-rnc.
146. Dwyer, supra note 145, at B10.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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police officers have regularly used video surveillance cameras to engage in
"up-skirting" and "down-blousing"-using cameras to take pictures up
women's skirts or down their blouses on city streets.14 9 Former New York
City Councilman and New York State Senator Hiram Monserrate, a retired
police officer, publicly recalled behavior he observed while part of a Queens
VIPER unit: "Some of the stuff I witnessed was what I would term as clear-
ly inappropriate use of the cameras in their surveillance-whether they are
looking into people's windows or some of the male police officers looking at
women."150
Studies show that the majority of Americans feel, as Jeffrey Rosner
does, that video surveillance is warranted, and applaud its use to keep us
safe.' 5 ' However, any argument for video surveillance based on security
needs must take into account the reality that individuals make unwise, un-
ethical, and privacy-violating choices with some regularity. Without
enforceable regulations, disclosure, and public conversation, such incidents
will largely go unacknowledged and unaddressed. As Jeffrey Brown points
out, "In the way that the digital revolution has allowed consumers to easily
distribute, download, and edit movies and songs, it has allowed police to do
the same with surveillance footage."'52 Unchecked, these systems offer too
much potential, and even temptation, for abusive practices.
2. Free Speech
Another concern posed by video surveillance is the potential for in-
fringement on freedom of speech and association.1 3 The ACLU of Northern
California (ACLU-NC) has taken the position that video cameras in public
may chill speech by preventing anonymity.154 It has long been established by
the Supreme Court that it is unconstitutional for the government to require
149. WHO'S WATCHING?, supra note 15, at 12 (citing Three Arrested After Traffic Cain-
era Aimed at Passerby, ASSOCIATED PRESs (Sept. 15, 2003), available at http://
www.notbored.org/camera-abuses.html).
150. Id. (citing Sarah Wallace, Exclusive: NYPD Housing Surveillance Staffed By Cops
Under Investigation, WABC N.Y. (Apr. 22, 2004), transcript available at http://
nyc.indymedia.org/en/2004/04/37792.html).
151. See, e.g., John Esterbrook, Poll: Americans OK With Video Scrutiny, CBS NEWS
(Feb. I1, 2009). available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/04/21/opinion/polls/
main506822.shtml (stating that Americans are willing to "put up with" surveillance cameras
in public places and "feel, by a three-to-one margin (72%-24%), that they will have to give up
some of their personal freedoms in order to make the country safe from terrorist attacks"); see
also Dwyer, supra note 145, at B10.
152. Brown, supra note 70, at 762.
153. MARK SCHLOSBERG & NICOLE A. OZER, AM. CivIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTH-
ERN CAL., UNDER THE WATCHFUL EYE: THE PROLIFERATION OF VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
SYSTEMS IN CALIFORNIA 7 (2007), available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal-justice/
police-practices/underthe-watchful-eye-the-proliferation of video surveillancesystems
in california.pdf [hereinafter UNDER THE WATCHFUL EYE].
154. Id.
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individuals to identify themselves while speaking in public,15 or to require
the disclosure of membership lists.15 6 The ACLU-NC argues that
"[i]nstalling cameras in public spaces is tantamount to requiring people to
identify themselves whenever they walk, speak, or meet in public."' 7 It is
widely accepted that surveillance practices may have a "chilling effect" on
individuals' freedom of expression and association. 58 The ACLU-NC ar-
gues that a video camera trained on the entrance of a building where an
organization holds meetings could reveal that organization's members just
as easily as a disclosed membership list.'59 In NAACP v. Alabama, the con-
stitutional violation at issue was the state's attempt to force the NAACP to
disclose its membership list.160 The use of video surveillance to videotape
the entryway to an organization's place of business or meeting location,
however, might enable a government to surreptitiously obtain the equivalent
of a membership list without having to make a request and without provid-
ing notice to the organization or its members. Fear of identification, as the
Supreme Court noted in NAACP v. Alabama, can chill speech by discourag-
ing membership in various types of organizations, the sharing of viewpoints
at odds with the government, or even simply being seen in certain places.161
These, in fact, have been the results of past NYPD surveillance efforts in
New York City.
New York City has a long history of police surveillance of individuals
and groups engaged in political protest and dissent.162 Between 1904 and
155. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1992) (holding that
Colorado could not require petition solicitors to wear identification badges because such a
requirement "discourages participation in the petition circulation process by forcing name
identification without sufficient cause").
156. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that the state
of Alabama could not compel the NAACP to disclose its membership lists).
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) ("[Ciompelled disclosure ... can
seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment");
NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462 ("This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom
to associate and privacy in one's associations.... Inviolability of privacy in group association
may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association.");
Am. Civil Liberties Union, What's Wrong With Public Video Surveillance? (Feb. 25, 2002),
http://www.acu.org/technology-and-liberty/whats-wrong-public-video-surveillance; Jessica
Pupovac, Chill of Govt. Surveillance Grips Activists, Muslims, THE NEW STANDARD (Jul. 11,
2006), http://www.truth-out.org/article/chill-govemment-surveillance-grips-activists-muslims;
Teresa Watanabe and Paloma Esquivel, L.A. Area Muslims Say FBI Surveillance Has a
Chilling Effect on Their Free Speech and Religious Practices, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/01/local/me-muslimi; see also Matthew Taylor and Paul
Lewis, Surveillance of Arms Trade Campaigner Was Unlawful, Says Appeals Court, THE
GUARDIAN (May 21, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/may/21/campaigner-police-
surveillance-ruled-unlawful.
159. UNDER THE WATCHFUL EYE, supra note 153, at 7.
160. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 449.
161. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.
162. See WHO'S WATCHING, supra note 15; Dunn Interview, supra note 12.
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1985 the NYPD compiled intelligence files on more than 200,000 individu-
als and groups, including those who were suspected of being communists,
Vietnam War protesters, health and housing advocates, education reform
groups, and civil rights activists.' In 1985, a class-action lawsuit finally led
to limitations on the NYPD's surveillance activities." The resulting "Hand-
schu Agreement" prohibited the NYPD from investigating the political,
ideological or religious activities of an individual or group unless the de-
partment had "specific information ... that a person or group engaged in
political activity is engaged in, about to engage in or has threatened to en-
gage in conduct which constitutes a crime."I 65 However, in 2003, largely as
a result of concerns about terrorism in the wake of September 1Ith, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York modified
the Handschu Agreement, allowing the NYPD far greater latitude to monitor
individuals involved in political activity.166 Under the new guidelines, the
police may commence a preliminary inquiry based upon "information indi-
cating the possibility of unlawful activity." 67
The result of the relaxation of the Handschu Agreement was evident
during the 2004 Republican National Convention. Without notice to the
public, the NYPD deployed extraordinary numbers of surveillance cameras
around the city (not only near Madison Square Garden, where the Conven-
tion was held),'6 8 and deployed police officers with hand-held cameras to
videotape protesters.169 Police intelligence officers were also deployed
nationally and internationally, in advance of the Convention, to obtain
information about individuals planning to visit New York City during the
Convention-logging data about even those individuals with "no apparent
intention of breaking the law."' Surveillance of this nature by the police
comes remarkably close to the type of surveillance and data collection prac-
ticed by the NYPD in the decades prior to the Handschu Agreement. Human
sensitivities to being monitored have not changed, and it remains likely that
such activity by law enforcement agencies will lead to a chilling effect on
speech and association.
163. Chisun Lee, The NYPD Wants to Watch You, VILLAGE VOICE (Dec. 17, 2002).
http://www.villagevoice.com/2002-12-17/news/the-nypd-wants-to-watch-you/l; see also WHO's
WATCHING?, supra note 15, at 8.
164. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 787
F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1986).
165. WHO'S WATCHING?, supra note 15, at 8; see Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1421.
166. Handschu, 288 F. Supp. 2d ("Second Revised Order and Judgment").
167. Id. at 422 (emphasis added); see also WHO's WATCHING?, supra note 15, at 8-9.
168. WHO's WATCHING?, supra note 15, at 9.
169. Id.; NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL
TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 50 (2009) (noting that during the
2004 Republican National Convention uniformed and undercover police officers used small,
handheld cameras to film as they moved through crowds).
170. Jim Dwyer, City Police Spied Broadly Before G.O.P. Convention, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/nyregion/25infiltrate.html?pagewanted=all.
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3. Discrimination and Bias
Discrimination and bias play an independent role in generating con-
cerns about video surveillance, and they also heighten privacy infringement
concerns and First Amendment chilling effects. While it is certainly not the
intent of this Note to make a generalized accusation that New York City po-
lice officers are biased, the targeting of minority communities in New York
City by the NYPD is long-standing. In 1999, then-Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer issued a report that found that police officers in New York City dis-
proportionately stopped and frisked blacks and Latinos as compared to
whites."' A decade later, this trend was reaffirmed by a study conducted by
Jeffrey A. Fagan.'72 The study showed not only continuing racial bias, but
also data indicating that, in more than thirty percent of stops over the six
years of the study, officers either lacked, or failed to report, the necessary
suspicion to make a stop constitutional."'
The kind of active bias-whether conscious or unconscious-that is
found in the NYPD's stop-and-frisk programs has also found its way into
police video surveillance. In 2004, the general public was largely unaware
of the NYPD's VIPER program. That changed when 22-year-old Paris Lane
committed suicide in the lobby of the Morris Houses in the Bronx, and his
death was caught on a surveillance camera monitored by VIPER Unit offic-
ers.' 74 The video found its way onto Consumption Junction, an Internet site
offering images of pornography and violence."' The video of Lane's death
was labeled "Introducing: The Self-Cleansing Housing Project."' 6 To add
insult to injury, the video also made its way to Lane's foster mother, Martha
Williams, who approached then-Manhattan Borough President C. Virginia
Fields for help in holding the NYPD accountable for the sharing of the vid-
eo."' The NYPD acknowledged that the camera that captured the suicide
171. OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY GEN. ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S 'STOP-AND-FRISK' PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK 89 (1999), available at http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/scandoclinks/
ocm43937374.htm ("There is a strong statistical correlation between race and likelihood of
being 'stopped.' "); see also Guirguis, supra note 6, at 151 (noting that in 2000, the NYPD
came under federal and state investigations for systematically targeting minorities in unwar-
ranted traffic stops).
172. Al Baker & Ray Rivera, Study Finds Street Stops by N.Y. Police Unjustified, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/27/nyregion/27frisk.html?
r-I&emc=etal.
173. Id.
174. WHO's WATCHING?, supra note 15, at I1.
175. Id.; Shaila K. Dewan, Video of Suicide in Bronx Appears on Shock Web Site, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/01/nyregion/video-of-suicide-in-
bronx-appears-on-shock-web-site.html; Video of Suicide in Bronx Housing Project Turns Up
on Website, NY I NEWS (Mar. 31, 2004), http://www.nyl.com/content/top-stories/38580/
video-of-suicide-in-bronx-housing-project-tums-up-on-website.
176. Dewan, supra note 175.
177. Id.
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recorded digital images, which meant that they could have been easily
emailed."'
Williams' complaint led to a public hearing, and a series of formal
questions posed to Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly by C. Virginia
Fields.'79 Commissioner Kelly responded with assurances that the NYPD
had regulations in place to protect tenants' privacy, VIPER Unit officers
were trained and supervised, and videotapes were stored in secure locations
and destroyed or erased after fourteen days unless they were needed for a
criminal investigation."so However, interviews conducted by a reporter for
Eyewitness News revealed a very different story. Former and current VIPER
Unit officers shared stories of officers videotaping "residents of the housing
development having sex" and sharing those videos with fellow officers.'
They also clarified the discrimination that seems practically inherent in the
program. As a former investigator stated, "If this was the Upper East Side it
wouldn't be happening. No one would have cameras on. But because it's the
so-called projects, no one really cares and it doesn't matter. We can film
you, and have entertainment, and do what we want and no one cares." 8 2 It is
difficult to imagine that incidents such as those that have occurred under
VIPER and other NYPD programs would not be equally possible under
LMSI/MMSI, particularly without implementation guidelines that are legal-
ly enforceable.
Finally, though it has not yet surfaced publicly in the United States, bias
in video surveillance that targets Muslim citizens could very easily become
a significant issue. In 2010, the British police apologized for having in-
stalled surveillance cameras, with no public notice, in predominantly
Muslim areas of the city of Birmingham."' More than 200 cameras were
placed in two Muslim neighborhoods in response to general concerns about
Islamic fundamentalism and potential terrorism threats.184 Recently, New
York City has seen the implementation of an alleged secret NYPD surveil-
lance program targeting Muslim communities, 85 and the revelation that at
178. WHO's WATCHING?, supra note 15, at I1; Jen Chung, Website's Suicide Video
Seems to Lead Back to NYPD, GOTHAMIST (Apr. 1, 2004), http://gothamist.com/2004/04/01/
websites-suicide-video_seems-to leadback-to nypd.php.
179. WHO's WATCHING?. supra note 15, at I1.
180. Id. (citing letter from Raymond W. Kelly to C. Virginia Fields, Apr. 27, 2004, on
file with the ACLU).
181. Id.; Sarah Wallace, Exclusive: NYPD Housing Surveillance Staffed By Cops Under
Investigation, WABC NEW YORK (Apr. 22, 2004), available at http://nyc.indymedia.orglen/
2004/04/37792.htmi.
182. WHO's WATCHING?, supra note 15, at I1.
183. British Police Offer Apology to Muslims for Spy Cameras, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1,
2010, at Al1.
184. Id.
185. New York City Council Public Safety Committee on NYPD Surveillance of
Muslim New Yorkers (Oct. 6, 2011), available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/releases/
TestimonyNYPDMuslimsurveillance_10.6.11 .pdf (testimony of Udi Offerson on behalf of
the N.Y. Civil Liberties Union); see Court Filing Seeks Information on NYPD Surveillance
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least 1,400 City police officers were shown a film during their training that
characterized Muslims as seeking to "infiltrate and dominate" the United
States.'86 New York City appears to be ripe for a similar scenario as Islam-
ophobia grows across the United States.
IV. PROJECTIONS AND APPLICATIONS
Civil liberties advocates are most concerned by the lack of disclosure of
how New York City's LMSI/MMSI video surveillance program operates and
the absence of any legal cause of action for abuse under the program, both
of which make the potential for violations far too great.'8 7 As the stories of
Paris Lane and Jeffrey Rosner demonstrate, abuse of video surveillance sys-
tems happens, and there is no clear way of monitoring or preventing it. It is
crucial that legally enforceable regulations be implemented to monitor and
limit police and government use of video surveillance systems. Regulations
should come from all levels of government, but most importantly at the local
level, where city councils can address the security issues specific to their
areas and balance the concerns of their constituents.
In New York City, two enormous barriers to discussion, debate, and en-
forcement of video surveillance regulations are the NYPD's court-supported
refusal to release the majority of documents related to the operations of vid-
eo surveillance programs and the unenforceable nature of the NYPD's
Public Security Privacy Guidelines. To date, there has not been a single pub-
lic hearing on LMSIIMMSI and their future progeny, nor has the City
Council taken on the task of regulating them.' 8 Without such efforts at pub-
lic education, discussion, and regulation, as new technologies continue to
develop the public will not have the opportunity to register concerns or
advocate for building enforceable limits. This opens the way for future un-
fettered public surveillance.
Targeting Muslims, N.Y. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.nyclu.org/news/
court-filing-seeks-information-nypd-surveillance-targeting-muslims; Colby Hamilton, NYCLU
Goes to Court Over NYPD's Muslim Surveillance, WNYC THE EMPIRE (Oct. 3. 2011),
http://empire.wnyc.org/tag/handschu; Colby Hamilton, With CIA Help, NYPD Moves Covertly
in Muslim Areas, WNYC THE EMPIRE (Aug. 24, 2011), http://empire.wnyc.org/2011/08/ap-
with-cia-help-nypd-moves-covertly-in-muslim-areas.
186. Michael Powell, In Shift, Police Say Leader Helped with Anti-Islam Film and Now
Regrets It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/nyregion/police-
commissioner-kelly-helped-with-anti-islam-film-and-regrets-it.htm; see also Michael Powell,
In Police Training, A Dark Film on U.S. Muslims, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/nyregion/in-police-training-a-dark-film-on-us-
muslims.html?_r=1 &ref=nyregion.
187. Dunn Interview, supra note 12, at 1.
188. Letter from Christopher Dunn, Donna Lieberman, and Robert Perry, N.Y. Civil
Liberties Union, to Comm'r Kelly and Deputy Comm'r Falkenrath, New York City Police
Dep't (Mar. 26, 2009) 1, 3 (on file with the N.Y. Civil Liberties Union) (noting the lack of
public hearings on the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative and the Public Security Privacy
Guidelines, and calling for a formal, public review) [hereinafter Dunn Letter].
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A. Mission Creep and Technological Advances
Surveillance programs in New York City also contain strong potential
for mission creep-the expansion of a project or a mission beyond its stated
goals.'89 Law enforcement officers might use images for un-sanctioned or
illegal purposes, such as to create video archives of protesters, or to target
minority individuals.' 90 Additional concerns include the lack of a legally
cognizable, reasonable expectation of privacy on public streets, and the
un-tested nature of applying the plain view doctrine (which allows law
enforcement to seize, without a warrant, evidence found in plain view dur-
ing a lawful observation)' 91 to surveillance as technologies change.
Individuals on the street are generally not protected by any reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, with regard to actions or items that can be easily seen
by normal vision.192 While New Yorkers may not have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy on the street, it is not necessarily the case that we shed our
privacy "in its entirety at [our] doorstep."' 93 The problem is that we lack any
real clarity as to the breadth of our privacy that remains once we leave our
homes, as well as how a reasonable expectation of privacy is determined.
From how far away may a camera zoom in on a letter we are reading on a
park bench or an email on a Blackberry while walking-something likely
unreadable by a police officer passing by? May a surveillance camera af-
fixed to a lamppost record an intimate conversation on the other end of the
block? May a camera peer through a car window?
Public video surveillance programs also have implications for at-home
privacy. The Supreme Court's ruling in Kyllo v. United States established
that Fourth Amendment protections are strongest in the home.194 But the
home is not sacrosanct. The Court preserved the "lawfulness of warrantless
visual surveillance of a home,"' 95 noting that, under the plain view doctrine,
visual observation is not a search.'96 Without any clear limitations on video
surveillance programs, it seems possible-if not likely-that the limits to
Fourth Amendment protections in the home, affirmed by the Supreme Court
in Kyllo, could make new types of privacy encroachments possible. One can
imagine a surveillance camera with pan-tilt-zoom capabilities, affixed to a
189. Mission Creep, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/mission%20creep (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (Mission creep is "the
gradual broadening of the original objectives of a mission or organization.").
190. WHO's WATCHING?, supra note 15, at 8.
191. See, e.g., Ill. v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (explaining that the plain view
doctrine is premised on the idea that when police are "lawfully in a position to observe an item
firsthand, its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost").
192. Guirguis, supra note 6, at 157; see also Cal. v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988);
Ill. v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
193. Guirguis, supra note 6, at 157-58.
194. Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
195. Id. at 27, 32.
196. Id.
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public lamp post; from there, it would not be difficult to imagine that cam-
era tilting and zooming through the window of an apartment and recording
the activities of the individuals inside. If an individual fails to close the
shades of his tenth floor apartment window, is anyone or anything in that
apartment fair game for video surveillance?
The Supreme Court has recently eschewed an opportunity to establish
the possibility of a legal challenge to video surveillance, at least on an indi-
vidual level, in its decision in United States v. Jones.'97 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia had previously held that prolonged
GPS surveillance violated a defendant's reasonable expectation of priva-
cy.'98 During a joint investigation by the FBI and the District of Columbia's
Metropolitan Police Department, the government planted a GPS tracking
device on the appellant's car and monitored his travel over a month-long
period.'" The government used the evidence gleaned from the surveillance
to convict him of trafficking in narcotics.20 Jones argued before the D.C.
Circuit that the extended period of surveillance had violated his Fourth
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy.20' The D.C. Circuit
agreed. 202 While the court did not disturb the general constitutionality of
GPS surveillance, it did hold that such surveillance over the course of many
weeks resulted in such an intimate picture of an individual's life as to violate
a reasonable expectation of privacy. 203 The D.C. Circuit's reasoning suggests
possible challenges to video surveillance in cases, for example, where a vid-
eo camera is trained on a street (or on an entryway or window) to capture an
individual's daily movements on an ongoing basis.
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the D.C. Circuit's ruling, but
without offering support for the types of challenges to video surveillance
suggested by the lower court's ruling. 204 The Court was divided on the
reasoning for its decision, with the majority avoiding the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy standard altogether. The majority opinion, authored by
Justice Scalia, focused on the government's intrusion into private property
197. U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (U.S. 2011).
198. U.S. v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
199. U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
200. Id.
201. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555.
202. Id. at 563-64.
203. Id. at 560 ("[Tihe whole of a person's movements over the course of a month is not
actually exposed to the public because the likelihood a stranger would observe all those
movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil. It is one thing for a passerby to observe or
even to follow someone during a single journey as he goes to the market or returns home from
work. It is another thing entirely for that stranger to pick up the scent again the next day and
the day after that, week in and week out, dogging his prey until he has identified all the places,
people, amusements, and chores that make up that person's hitherto private routine.").
204. U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 ("The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit is affirmed."); id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (joining the Court's opinion, but
setting out different reasoning); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring) (joining the Court's opinion,
but setting out different reasoning).
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by placing the tracking device on Jones' car, rather than on the sustained
nature of the surveillance.2 05 The majority held that an individual's vehicle is
an "effect," in which the individual has a right to be secure under the Fourth
Amendment, and that the government violated the Fourth Amendment by
"physically occupiying] private property for the purpose of obtaining infor-
mation."206 Commentary immediately following the ruling has suggested
that Jones indicates "a majority of the justices are prepared to apply broad
Fourth Amendment privacy principles to bring the Fourth Amendment's ban
on unreasonable searches into the digital age, when law enforcement offi-
cials can gather extensive information without ever entering an individual's
home or vehicle." 207 It is true that in two concurring opinions by Justice So-
tomayor and Justice Alito, five justices noted that much surveillance no
longer relies upon physical intrusion of, for instance, a home, and that a
modern interpretation of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard is
needed.208 However, the majority did not rely on this more modern view of
the needs of Fourth Amendment protections, preferring a narrower ruling
grounded in private property protections.2 09
The majority view differed significantly from the emphasis placed by
Justice Sotomayor, in her concurring opinion, on the position that "the
Fourth Amendment is not concerned only with trespassory intrusions on
property."210 Justice Sotomayor emphasized, "[A] Fourth Amendment search
occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy
that society recognizes as reasonable," 21' and "does not turn upon the pres-
ence or absence of a physical intrusion."2 12 Justice Sotomayor, along with
Justice Alito in a separate concurrence, noted that technological advances,
which enable nontrespassory surveillance techniques-that is, surveillance
that does not depend on entry into, or attachment to, private property-will
shape the evolution of society's privacy expectations. 213 The question that
remains after United States v. Jones is how such expectations will evolve:
205. U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (U.S. 2011).
206. Id. at 949 ("The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that 'the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.' It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an 'effect' as that
term is used in the Amendment.") (citing U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)) (some
internal quotations omitted).
207. Adam Liptak, Justices Say GPS Tracker Violated Privacy Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/us/police-use-of-gps-is-ruled-unconstitutional.html?-
r-2&hp.
208. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J, concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concur-
ring).
209. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
210. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
211. Id. (citing Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 31-33 (2001)).
212. Id. at 955. (citing Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).
213. Id. ("[Pihysical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance."); id.
at 957 (Alito, J., concurring) ("This case requires us to apply the Fourth Amendment's prohi-
bition of unreasonable searches and seizures to a 21st-century surveillance technique.").
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will new technology heighten the public's reasonable expectations of priva-
cy, or will it do away with them altogether?
Indeed, the rapid development of new technology impacts all concerns
related to video surveillance. In New York City, it is unclear how, when, and
whether the City and law enforcement will adopt new surveillance programs
and systems. For example, the NYPD's Guidelines currently state that the
Domain Awareness System does not use facial recognition technology.214
However, the Guidelines also state that technologies used by the System
may "utilize or be integrated with systems and technologies deployed by
other bureaus and divisions of the NYPD."2 15 No guidelines exist to regulate
what systems and technologies might be integrated through this clause, or
how their utilizations or integrations might take place, leaving the field wide
open for expansion and mission creep. In addition to the possible use of ex-
isting technologies that are not explicitly authorized, there is also the
unanswered question of how new technologies will be adopted, and what
limits may or may not be placed on their adoption.
B. Balancing Security, Privacy and Free Speech
There are compelling and reasonable arguments in favor of video sur-
veillance programs. But there are equally compelling and reasonable
arguments for caution in implementing and maintaining them. The lack of
public dialogue with regard to such systems should not be interpreted as a
lack of concern; rather, it is more likely an indication of the limits of public
knowledge about either the programs or the remarkable absence of public
control over their operation. If surveillance cameras are to be ubiquitous,
public education and dialogue are the only likely tools we have to monitor
potential abuses and challenge them when they occur. The NYPD and city
officials have had ample opportunity to take the lead in initiating public dia-
logue, but have failed to do so. One place for the public to start is in
considering and advocating for legally enforceable regulations over video
surveillance that would go further to protect privacy and First Amendment
rights.
The City Council is the ideal starting point for regulating video surveil-
lance in New York City, as it is well-positioned to facilitate public dialogue
and to draft and pass legislation. The process of legislating regulations
would require at least three key steps: (1) consideration and editing of the
stated objectives of the LMSIIMMSI; (2) review of information regarding
operations of the programs and determination of the most information that
can safely be made public; and (3) determination of the most stringent pri-
vacy protections available without stripping the NYPD of its ability to keep
the public safe. Such determinations require balancing a range of interests,
214. NYPD Guidelines, supra note 34, at 3.
215. Id.
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which is why the City Council (which shares the interests of New Yorkers as
well as the NYPD and its stakeholders) is better positioned than the NYPD
(which has a clear perspective on one side of the debate) to set regulations.
Regulations should clearly state the objectives of such programs; mandate
public disclosure of much of the operations of the programs-particularly
with regard to data storage, use, and sharing; and ensure the availability of
legally cognizable claims regarding privacy violations and other abuses.
1. Clarifying Objectives
Much of the stated purpose of LMSI and MMSI is compelling, and hard
to contradict. To observe "pre-operational activity by terrorist organiza-
tions," "aid in the detection of preparations to conduct terrorist attacks,"
"deter terrorist attacks," and "reduce incident response times" are all noble
goals.216 As Jeffrey Rosner explained, after he experienced an invasion of his
privacy by the NYPD,217 post-September 11th New Yorkers, like most
Americans, generally favor the presence of cameras to deter another terrorist
attack.218 If the Guidelines' Statement of Purpose set out solely the goals
above, there would likely be little to debate, at least with regard to objec-
tives.
However, two key facets of the Statement of Purpose are vague and con-
fusing, and it is difficult to connect them with the other four points. First, it
is not clear what is meant by "provid[ing] a degree of common domain
awareness for all Stakeholders,"219 nor why doing so is important. Second, it
is not clear what is meant by "creat[ing] a common technological infrastruc-
ture to support the integration of new security technology,"2 20 nor what the
parameters of such an infrastructure and new technology might be.
The first point, providing common domain awareness for all stakehold-
ers in the LMSI/MMSI, is concerning for two reasons. The NYPD has
integrated private entities into City security and surveillance programs 221
with little to no public disclosure or dialogue. The NYPD has not shared its
reasons for doing so, nor has it shared any standards it uses to determine
which private entities to integrate. It is not clear what, if any, vetting process
216. NYPD Guidelines, supra note 34, at 2-3.
217. See Dwyer supra note 145.
218. See, e.g., John Esterbrook, Poll: Americans OK with Video Scrutiny, CBS NEWS
(Feb. I1, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/04/2 1 /opinion/polls/main506822.shtm]
(stating that Americans are willing to "put up with" surveillance cameras in public places, and
"feel, by a three-to-one margin (72%-24%), that they will have to give up some of their per-
sonal freedoms in order to make the country safe from terrorist attacks"); Michelle Lirtzman,
Poll: Surveillance Cameras, ABC NEWS (Jul. 29, 2007), available at http://
abcnews.go.com/images/US/l041a5Surveillance.pdf (reporting that Americans support the
increased use of surveillance cameras by almost a three-to-one margin).
219. NYPD Guidelines, supra note 34, at 3.
220. Id.
221. NYPD Press Release (noting the establishment of workstations in the Lower Man-
hattan Security Coordination Center for "the NYPD's various public and private partners").
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may be utilized to screen stakeholders or to hold them accountable to the
limited regulations the NYPD enforces over the program. Further, the
NYPD also has not set out how "a degree of common domain awareness" is
identified, and why it is important for private entities to share the level of
security awareness that the NYPD enjoys. 222
Integrating private entities into public safety programs opens such pro-
grams to conflicting purposes and priorities. It also may increase
opportunities for misuse of data and privacy violations due to expanding
access to such data to a variety of parties with differing interests, objectives,
and levels of experience. Such integrations should not be undertaken with-
out public awareness and legislative approval.
The second point, creating a common technological infrastructure to
support the integration of new security technology, is troubling for related
reasons. First, it is unclear with whom the infrastructure is to be "common."
The Guidelines do not state whether it is to be common as between the
NYPD and its private stakeholders, or whether there are other entities-such
as federal investigative agencies-that are also included. Second, there are
no boundaries established with regard to the integration of new security
technology, leaving the field wide open for the NYPD, its private stakehold-
ers, and any other unnamed partners, to experiment with new technologies
without informing the public. For instance, as discussed above, while the
Guidelines assure that facial recognition technology will not be used as part
of the Domain Awareness System,223 it is not at all clear that the NYPD and
its stakeholders can be prevented from using such technology, should it be
deemed an important new security technology to integrate. As surveillance
technology develops quickly in the twenty-first century, it appears that the
Guidelines have created an open platform for experimentation without any
mandate to provide public notice.
Objectives for the LMSI/MMSI (as well as for any public surveillance
program) can only be set responsibly through dialogue with the public. In
the case of the Guidelines, there were no public hearings held to provide
New Yorkers with a chance to understand the new programs, ask questions,
raise concerns, and present goals and boundaries.224 The Guidelines were
made public on the New York City Police Department's website for one
month prior to their adoption, and a press release provided an NYPD email
address to which concerns and questions could be directed.225 Less than 100
comments were made, which has caused at least one City official to claim
that New Yorkers were not concerned about either the Guidelines or the
222. NYPD Guidelines, supra note 34, at 3 (providing for "common domain awareness"
but refraining from defining the term or clarifying its meaning).
223. Id.
224. See Dunn Letter, supra note 188.
225. Press Release, N.Y.C. Police Dep't, New York City Police Department Releases
Draft of Public Security Privacy Guidelines for Public Comment (Feb. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pr/pr_2009_005.shtml.
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LMSI/MMSI program. 226 It is not necessarily the case, however, that so few
comments are evidence of a lack of concern. It is also possible that most
New Yorkers do not learn of events in their city from NYPD press releas-
es, and that many members of the public were unaware of the Guidelines
during the period provided for review and comment. It is also possible that
those New Yorkers who were aware of the public comment period were
discouraged from sharing comments directly with the New York City
Police Department, for fear of being identified and targeted. It is for this
reason that such processes are best placed into the hands of legislators; in
such cases, the processes may at the very least become a matter of public
record, providing for some amount of accountability, and at best they may
be opened to meaningful public debate and dialogue.
2. Providing Information
Information about the operations of the LMSI/MMSI has been very lim-
ited and difficult to come by. Following the New York State Supreme
Court's 2009 and 2010 rulings, the NYPD is exempted from having to pro-
duce any documents involving "the operational details of the LMSI, such as
the types of information to be collected and how the information will be
used, shared and stored and for how long,"227 as well as any communications
within and between agencies and stakeholders involved in the LMSI.228 It is
certainly reasonable that some operational details of security programs must
be kept confidential in the interest of public safety. However, information
regarding the length of time data may be stored and rules regulating its use
are of great concern to members of the public, who are directly impacted by
such regulations. Similarly, information about the process by which security
systems such as the LMSI/MMSI were initiated, almost certainly captured
in communications between the NYPD and stakeholders, is of great interest
to the public. Such information promises to shed greater light on the most
salient internal objectives of the programs, in comparison to the vague ob-
jectives presently shared with the public. It also provides room for the
public to question such objectives, and the strategies set for achieving them.
For example, the Guidelines provide that all personnel in the Lower
Manhattan Security Coordination Center are required to undergo privacy
training.2 29 However, the public has not received any clear information re-
garding what type of training is required. It appears that the training course
is a three-hour-long program developed by a private contractor who tailored
the course specifically to the NYPD's system with "practical real-world ex-
amples," clearly setting out "privacy principles."23 0 It may be true that this
226. Anonymous Interview, supra note 9.
227. New York Civil Liberties Union, 242 N.Y.L.J. at 9-10 (2009).
228. New York Civil Liberties Union, No. 12145.
229. NYPD Guidelines, supra note 34, at 6-7.
230. Anonymous Interview, supra note 9.
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program is highly effective in training NYPD and stakeholder personnel to
value and protect the privacy of New Yorkers. The program may effectively
help them to identify and balance precarious situations in which security
interests and privacy interests must be carefully weighed. But there is no
information publicly available about the program to truly reassure those who
are subject to video surveillance in the City, such as what "privacy princi-
ples" are communicated, what examples trainees are given to help them
identify situations in which they must prioritize privacy, and how personnel
are monitored and assessed. 231 In the case of Paris Lane, for instance, Com-
missioner Kelly asserted in the aftermath of the scandal that the NYPD had
regulations in place to protect tenants' privacy and that VIPER Unit officers
were trained and supervised. 232 Whatever training that occurred did little to
protect the privacy of Paris Lane and his family. Similarly, the current lack
of information about privacy training in the Lower Manhattan Security Co-
ordination Center does little to engender trust among surveilled New
Yorkers. It also does little to provide accountability when privacy principles
are breached.
A further example of the type of highly relevant information withheld
from the public is the management of the retention and use of data collected
from surveillance cameras. The Guidelines state that video data is destroyed
after thirty days, and it has been suggested by at least one City official that a
thirty-day deletion policy is unprecedented and an important concession for
privacy protection.233 However, recent surveillance history in New York City
suggests otherwise. Again, in the case of Paris Lane, the policy of the
VIPER program was to store videotapes in secure locations and to destroy
or erase them after fourteen days. 234 The fourteen-day deletion policy was
more stringent than the LMSI/MMSI's thirty-day deletion policy; however,
it still allowed for privacy violations. This example suggests that time-based
retention policies are not sufficient to secure the data of New Yorkers. There
must be clear regulations that detail how such data is stored, who has access
to it, how it may be accessed, and under what circumstances it may be uti-
lized. The Guidelines make vague statements that gesture toward regulating
these elements, but provide no concrete information. Even assuming that
clear and stringent regulations are in place and cannot be revealed due to
security concerns, it should be possible that more information might be
231. NYPD Guidelines, supra note 34, at 7 (stating that all personnel in the Lower Man-
hattan Security Coordination Center will undergo "periodic assessments" related to their
privacy training).
232. New York Civil Liberties Union, 242 N.Y.L.J. at 3 (citing letter from Raymond W.
Kelly to C. Virginia Fields, Apr. 27, 2004, on file with the NYCLU).
233. Anonymous Interview, supra note 9 (stating that a thirty-day deletion policy has
"significant implications" for potentially hindering police work, but that it was a concession
made to privacy concerns).
234. New York Civil Liberties Union, 242 N.Y.L.J. at 3 (citing letter from Raymond W.
Kelly to C. Virginia Fields, Apr. 27, 2004, on file with the NYCLU).
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provided beyond the statement that use is permitted "in furtherance of the
purposes set out in the Statement of Purpose."235 New Yorkers should be
assured that there is a chain of command, that supervisors are on hand to
authorize any use or retention of data, and that substantial protections are in
place to prevent unauthorized use or retention of data.
These examples demonstrate that voluntary self-regulatory guidelines
adopted by the NYPD are insufficient in establishing the privacy rights of
New Yorkers. The Guidelines do riot provide assurance that meaningful
measures are in place to protect New Yorkers' privacy. For this reason, it is
preferable for the City Council to adopt regulations that are binding on the
NYPD and its stakeholders. Legislation provides the most promising means
of establishing clear objectives for surveillance programs that balance secu-
rity concerns against other public interests, establishing regulations for the
retention, use, and sharing of data and monitoring the interaction between
the NYPD and private stakeholders. Legislation is also the best means of
ensuring that the regulations are made public and that the public is given
meaningful opportunity to discuss and debate the measures before they are
implemented. While legislation did not precede the implementation of the
LMSI/MMSI, it is not too late to effect legislation to regulate these security
systems.
3. Ensuring Protections
In 2006, the NYCLU set out a list of recommendations for making vid-
eo surveillance more accountable to the public. 236 These recommendations
have not been addressed by the NYPD, the City Council, or even the media,
but they are useful in offering key provisions that might be included in City
legislation regulating video surveillance. The key provisions are: (1) the
establishment of "specific and justifiable" objectives for surveillance pro-
grams; (2) public notice in areas where video cameras are currently, or are
planned to be, installed; (3) a guarantee that personnel operating or control-
ling access to surveillance cameras and data are properly trained and
supervised; (4) the establishment of clear rules and procedures for the reten-
tion, storage, and destruction of video surveillance images; and (5) the
explicit prohibition of unlawful practices with regard to video surveillance
cameras, with legal penalties for violations. 237
In establishing objectives for video surveillance programs, the City
should undertake needs assessments prior to the installation of cameras, and
make those assessments public and open to public discussion. Any legisla-
tion should also provide for regular audits to determine the ongoing efficacy
of video surveillance and the programs' compliance with laws and regula-
235. NYPD Guidelines, supra note 34, at 4-5.
236. WHO's WATCHING?, supra note 15, at 13.
237. Id. at 13-16.
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tions. The City and the NYPD may have already undertaken such assess-
ments, but they have not been required to produce documentation, so it is
impossible for the public to gain substantive knowledge about the objectives
of New York City's video surveillance programs, and the status of those ob-
jectives. Further, legislation should require public notice in
neighborhoods and areas where video cameras will be-or are currently-
installed. The Guidelines do set out a notification requirement; 238 however,
since the Guidelines are not legally enforceable, there is no guarantee that
cameras are consistently marked. The process of public notice should also
provide residents meaningful opportunities to participate in decisions re-
garding location and operation of cameras. Signs indicating the presence of
cameras are insufficient. The NYPD and the City government should under-
take public education, and hold public hearings in areas where cameras are
or will be placed, to inform residents about the scope of the cameras, and
allow them the opportunity to air concerns, and learn what legal processes
and protections may or may not be available to them.
City legislation must require that individuals charged with operating or
controlling access to video surveillance cameras will be properly trained and
closely supervised, and should set out regulations addressing the number of
hours of training required, the subjects to be covered in training sessions,
the regularity of trainings and assessments, and the standards to be met in
assessing both training programs and the actions of personnel. Given prior
incidents that would reasonably dissolve public confidence in their police to
properly execute such programs, the public should be assured that a high-
level of training and supervision is in place and that changes have been
made since the most recent reported incidents. Legislation must also clarify
a chain of command and set out processes for approval by establishing clear
rules and procedures for the retention, storage, and destruction of video sur-
veillance images. The Guidelines set out some standards with regard to
these issues, but they permit each standard to be overridden on a case-by-
case basis, without a standard for public disclosure of the process for an
override.2 39 This is insufficient and should be addressed by legislation. Fi-
nally, the City must provide legal penalties for violations of its regulations.
It is not sufficient for the NYPD to set out a series of unenforceable
Guidelines; regulations must be legally enforceable in order to be meaning-
ful, and legislation should be passed to ensure that they are.
CONCLUSION
There are legitimate security concerns-both local and national-that
offer compelling reasons for the use of video surveillance programs. The
purpose of this Note has not been to challenge them; rather, it has been to
238. NYPD Guidelines, supra note 34, at 3.
239. Id.
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highlight the problems that emerge when information about such programs
is withheld from the public in the name of national security, when oversight
policies are vague and unenforceable, and when no legal mechanism exists
to hold public institutions accountable for violations. Only through clear
objectives, public education, and the ability to legally enforce standards for
the use of surveillance technologies will the public be able to challenge sur-
veillance that encroaches on privacy, First Amendment rights, and basic
dignity. A case in point is the controversy over the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA)'s newly invasive security screening policies that were
deployed towards the end of 2010.240 Only after vehemently negative public
reaction did the TSA begin to back off its previous hardline position. In the
wake of public calls for protests that would have crippled the United States'
air transportation system during Thanksgiving weekend, the TSA suggested
that the program "will be adapted as conditions warrant," to make them "as
minimally invasive as possible, while still providing the security that the
American people want and deserve."24 '
There has been no such public reaction to video surveillance cameras in
New York City, very likely because the program is not as publicly recog-
nizable as a security screening program implemented in airports across the
nation. To date, the only available challenge to surveillance cameras must
come as a response to specific, individual cases of privacy violation, dis-
crimination, or the chilling of free speech. Such challenges depend on
individuals to recognize a violation and to have the courage and resources to
come forward and bring a challenge, without any guarantee of legal re-
course. In such cases, post-violation complaints and litigation cannot be
fully satisfying to those whose privacy, speech protections, or dignity have
been violated. Even victories in court cannot make such individuals fully
whole. Without enforceable regulations and legislation, at least at the local
level, New Yorkers will be subject to unchecked surveillance that will only
expand as technology produces more and more options.
240. Susan Stellin, Pat-Downs at Airports Prompt Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/1l/19/business/19security.html?ref=transportation
security-administration.
241. Mike Allen, TSA Chief Screening May Evolve, POLITICO (Nov. 21, 2010),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1 I110/45460.html.
[Vol. 18:589
